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Case No. 18164 
* * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of a dispute regarding the 
interpretation of a written lease agreement, and the 
parties' respective rights thereunder. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court found that under a lease agree-
ment Plaintiff was entitled to possession of the 
premises in dispute. The lower Court awarded Plain-
tiff a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant from 
interfering with Plaintiff's possession of the premises, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
money damages, and an award of attorney's fees. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the trial 
court judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, an entry of 
judgment in favor of Defendant on Defendant's Counter-
claim, and the action to be remanded to the lower court 
for a determination of the amount of damages sustained 
by Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Fashion Place Associates, the Defendant-appellant 
(hereinafter Fashion Place) is the lessor of the Fashion 
Place Mall which is situated in the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah. The corporate Plaintiff-respondent, 
Fashions Four Corporation (hereinafter Fashions Four) was 
the lessee of certain commercial premises at the 
Fashion Place Mall under a written lease agreement 
dated May 6, 1974. (R. 8). 
From 1974 through September of 1978 Fashions 
Four operated a connnercial women's ready-to-wear store 
under the trade name 11 Clrnrlie' s" in the leased premises . 
. 2. 
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(T. 28) In September 1978 Fashions Four sold that 
business to Norsal Development Corporation (herein-
after Norsal), subject to Fashion Place Associates' 
approval of the assignment of the lease to Norsal. 
(T. 32) Article 15 of the written lease agreement 
required the lessor's consent for any assignment or 
transfer of the lease. (R. 20) 
Fashion Place Associates consented to the 
assignment of the lease to Norsal and a written 
assignment was prepared by ~ashion Place reflecting 
that consent, as well as the agreement of Fashions 
Four as assignor and Norsal as assignee to be bound 
by the terms of the lease agreement, with specific 
reference to the "consent to assignment" provisions 
of the original lease agreement. (T. 31, R. 60, 61) 
The written assignment was circulated for sig-
nature. (T. 32) It was signed by Fashions Four as 
assignor. (T. 32, R. 61) However, the original 
document was apparently lost in transit and was not 
signed by either Fashion Place Associates or Norsal. 
(R. 61) Despite the failure to complete the execution 
process, Fashion Place Associates, Fashions Four 
Corporation, and Norsal all respected the assignment, 
and no challenge was raised to Norsal's right to 
. 3. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
possession of the premises. (R. 72) 
In November of 1979, without the knowledge of 
Fashion Place Associates, all the stock of Norsal was 
conveyed to Neil Davidson, who prior to that time had 
been a minor shareholder of the corporation. (T. 93) 
The business known as "Charlie's was. the sole asset 
of Norsal. (T. 93) 
"Charlie's" under Neil Davidson and Norsal was 
not a profitable operation. (T. 100) On a number 
of occasions rent was not paid in a timely fashion. 
(T. 100) Between October 1980 and June of 1981, three 
separate actions were initiated by the lessor Fashion 
Place Associates seeking rental arrearages and/or 
recovery of the premises. (T. 110, 115, 127) 
By early June of 1981, the inventory of "Charlie's" 
had been attached by judgment creditors and a sheriff's 
sale of the inventory had been scheduled. (T. 43) 
On June 10, 1981, Norsal and Neil Davidson agreed 
to assign the lease back to Fashions Four Corporation. 
(T. 99) On June 11, 1981, Neil Davidson on behalf of 
Norsal signed two documents prepared by Elgin Williams 
on behalf of Fashions Four Corporation, a repossession 
agreement (R. 149), and an assignment of lease. (R. 150) 
Fashion Place Associates had no knowledge of this agree-
ment. (T. 155) Apparently the keys to the premises 
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were delivered to Elgin Williams for Fashions Four 
Corporation on June 11. (T. 90) 
store remained closed. 
However, the 
On or about June 19, 1981, after consultation 
with counsel, Fashion Place Associates put its own 
lock on the premises on the grounds that the store had 
been closed for more than 15 days and that Norsal had 
failed to pay any rent for several months, including 
the June rental payment. Norsal had not notified 
Fashion Place Associates that it intended to be absent 
from the premises, and except for the personal property 
in the premises, there was no evidence that Norsal 
was occupying the premises. (T. 165) The conditions 
mandated by statute for a presumption of abandonment 
entitling a lessor to re-enter lease premises appeared 
to have been met. Section 78-36-12.3(3), U.C.A. (1953, 
as amended) . 
On June 18, 1982, Mr. Williams on behalf of 
Fashions Four returned to "Charlie'sn for the first 
time since June 11 and allegedly discovered the Fashion 
Place lock on the premises. (T. 44) On June 19, 1982 
Mr. Williams met with the managers of the Fashion Place 
Mall, Tom Estes and Bob Garwood. (T. 45) Mr. Williams 
told them that he wanted to operate "Charlie's" 
. 5. 
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and that he had retaken possession of the premises 
from Norsal. (T. 46, 47) Mr. Estes responded by 
saying that Fashions Four could not retake possession 
because the store had been abandoned by Norsal and 
that the lessor had possession of the premises. (T.46) 
The managers also indicated that Fashions Four could 
not take possession of the premises without the Lessor's 
consent under the written lease agreement. (T. 47) 
Thereafter Fashion Place Associates continued to deny 
that Fashions Four had a right to possession of the 
premises. 
The instant action was filed more than a month 
later on July 23, 1982. (R. 2) On that same day, 
the lower court issued a temporary restraining order 
directing that Fashions Four be put in possession of 
the premises. (R. 39) Fashion Place Associates com-
plied with the Court order putting Fashions Four in 
possession no later than July 31, 1981. (T. 72) 
On or about August 1, 1981, Fashions Four 
Corporation finalized their purchase of the attached 
inventory which allowed Fashions Four to begin operating 
the store. (T. 72) 
. 6. 
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The lessor Fashion Place Associates counter-
claimed asserting that the temporary restraining 
order had been wrongfully issued and that Fashions Four 
could not have any possessory interest in the premises 
without the lessor's consent. (R. 55) 
Trial was held on October 6 and 7, 1981 before 
the Honorable Jay E. Banks. On October 23, 1981 the 
lower court by minute order found for the Plaintiff 
Fashions Four Corporation against the Defendant 
Fashion Place Associates. (R. 180) Fashions Four 
Corporation was awarded a permanent injunction pro-
hibiting Fashion Place Associates from interfering 
with Fashions Four's possession of the premises, general 
damages in the amount of $3,500, and $7,000 in attorney's 
fees. (R. 207) 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law, judgment 
and pennanent injunction were duly entered by the Court 
on November 24, 1981. (R. 208) 
The trial court entered an order on December 7, 1981 
denying Fashion Place Associates' motion for amendment 
of the judgment or a new trial. (R. 216) Defendant's 
notice of appeal was filed on January 5, 1982. (R. 222) 
. 7. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS A MATTER OF·LAW THE JUNE 11, "ASSIGNMENT 
BACK" OF THE LEASE DID NOT TRANSFER ANY 
INTEREST IN THE LEASE TO FASHIONS FOUR 
CORPORATION BECAUSE THE CONSENT OF THE 
LESSOR FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES WAS NOT 
OBTAINED AS REQUIRED BY THE LEASE AGREE-
MENT. 
On June 11, 1981 as judgment creditors of 
Norsal and Neil Davidson were arranging the liquidation 
of the "Charlie's" inventory, Norsal and Neil Davidson 
attempted to assign the lease "back" to the original 
tenant, Fashions Four Corporation. Fashions Four 
Corporation's claim to any interest in the lease stands 
or falls on the validity of that June 11 transfer. 
It is undisputed that the lease agreement which 
Norsal was attempting to assign to Fashions Four 
Corporation provides in clear and unambiguous language 
that no interest can be transfered without the lessor's 
written consent. (R. 20) It is also undisputed that the 
June 11 conveyance from Norsal to Fashions Four Corpora-
tion was made without the lessor's consent. Despite 
the failure of Norsal and/or Fashions Four Corporation to 
obtain the lessor's consent, the trial court found that 
the June 11 transfer was effective. (R. 204) From the 
. 8. 
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standpoint of well-established contract law, as well 
as public policy, that finding was erroneous. 
Modern connnercial leases, particularly those 
involving enclosed shopping malls, tend to be both 
long and complex. By way of example, the body of the 
lease involved in the instant action is 31 pages in 
length and contains 35 separate articles. The parties 
to such leases are sophisticated participants in the 
commercial arena. The leases adopted by such parties 
attempt to address in detail every possible question 
or potential problem that could arise between the 
lessor and the lessee. Specific references to the 
circumstances under which assignment or conveyance 
of the lease will be allowed are standard. 
Assignment or transfer of a lease interest by a 
tenant is critically important to the lessor of an 
enclosed shopping mall. The lessor has connnonly made 
contractual promises to other mall tenants regarding the 
kinds of tenants that will be allowed to lease space. 
By controlling the tenant mix, the lessor seeks to 
optimize retail opportunities for all mall ·tenants. 
Without that control, the lessor loses its ability to 
meet its contractual obligations to specific tenants, 
and its abil.i ty to optimize the connnercial environment 
. 9. 
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for all tenants. A lessor without the power to pass 
muster on a particular tenant may be faced with a 
poorly operated store that will hurt the business of 
all the adjoining tenants. 
The "consent to assignment" provisions of the 
standard retail lease play an essential role in pro-
tecting the interests of other tenants as well as the 
interests of the lessor. The "consent to assignment" 
provisions are contractual in nature and are intended 
to express a "meeting of the minds" of the leasing 
parties as regards the circumstances under which 
assignment, subletting, or any other conveyance or 
transfer will be allowed. 
A lease is a contract. Zeese vs. Estate of 
Siegel, 535 P.2d 85 (Utah, 1975). A written contract 
duly entered into should be regarded with some sanctity, 
and its connnitments can only be overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence. Otteson vs. Malone, 584 P.2d 878 
(Utah, 1978). Parties are free to contract according 
to their desires in whatever terms they can agree 
upon. The contract should be enforced according to 
its terms unless the result is so unconscionable that 
a court of equity will refuse to enforce it. Russell 
vs. Park City Utah Corporation, 548 P.2d 889 (Utah, 1976) . 
. 10. 
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Despite these basic principles of contract law, 
the trial court refused to enforce the "consent to 
assignment" provisions of the lease agreement, and 
instead recognized the validity of the June 11 assign-
ment from Norsal to Fashions Four Corporation, regardless 
of the fact that Fashion Place Associates did not consent 
to the transfer. 
The rationale of the trial court in arriving 
at that decision is apparently based on a rule 
announced in Coulos vs. Desimone, 208 P.2d 105, (Wash. 
1949), which follows an even older case, McCormick vs. 
Stowell, 138 Mass. 431, (Mass. 1885). These two cases 
adopt the rule that there exists a single hidden 
exception to the "consent to assignment" provisions 
of written lease agreements. It is the holding of 
these cases that despite specific language in a lease 
that assignment is prohibited without written consent 
of the lessor, an assignee may always assign back to the 
original tenant without the consent of the lessor. 
Following that principle, the trial court found that 
the consent of Fashion Place Associates to the June 
11 assignment back to Fashions Four Corporation was 
not required. 
.11. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The only rationale for this hidden exception to 
specific contract language offered by the Massachusetts 
case is that the lessor has consented to take the 
original lessee as his tenant for the full term 
mentioned in the lease. That consent remains available 
for any reassignment to the original lease during the 
tenn. The 1949 Washington case adopts that language 
without any analysis whatsoever. 
Because this is an issue of first impression in 
Utah, this Court should carefully consider the wisdom 
of adopting the Massachusetts position. The following 
considerations are important. 
The "consent to assignment" provisions of 
modern leases have two purposes. First, they are intended 
to reject by contract the common law rule that leaseholds 
are freely assig~able. Second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, such provisions are designed to insure that the 
lessor has a responsible tenant to look to for per-
formance of the lease. Adoption of the Massachusetts 
rule would make the attainment of these two goals 
impossible. 
A modern commercial lessor has no guarantee, 
and no reason to expect, that a responsible corporate 
.12. 
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tenant will still be responsible eight years after the 
execution of a 10 year lease. Assume the original 
corporate tenant, ABC Inc., assigns a lease after 
three years to XYZ Corporation. XYZ performs for five 
years and then wants to assign back to ABC Inc. ABC 
by that point may well have new officers, new share-
holders, perhaps an entirely different business. Does 
the fact that the corporation was a responsible 
tenant eight years before have any bearing or relevance 
whatsoever to its current qualifications? 
The straightforwardanswer to that question is 
no. For all practical purposes, from the lessor's 
perspective, the original corporate tenant is no 
different than any other potential tenant. If the 
lessor's contractual right to a responsible tenant 
is to be protected, it must have an opportunity to 
pass on the qualifications of all potential tenants, 
including those of an original corporate tenant. 
The rule announced in the Massachusetts case in 
1885 may well have made sense under the commercial 
conditions existing at the time, when the corporate 
form of business activity was less common than at present. 
It is equally clear that the adoption of this 19th 
century principle would not serve the needs of modern 
commerce. Given the opportunity, this Court should 
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reject the adoption of a rule that has the effect of 
writing a hidden exception into the clear and unambiguous 
language agreed to by both parties to the lease contract. 
Instead this Court should enforce the lease 
contract as it was written by the contracting 
parties, and refuse to recognize th~ June 11 "assign-
ment back" to Fashions Four Corporation from Norsal 
on the ground that Fashion Place Associates' consent 
was not obtained to that transfer. 
POINT II 
THE "CONSENT TO ASSIGNMENT" PROVISIONS 
OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT ARE APPLICABLE 
TO THE JUNE 11 "ASSIGNMENT BACK" FROM 
NORSAL TO FASHIONS FOUR CORPORATION. 
It is undisputed that Fashions Four Corporation's 
alleged possession of the lease premises arose from 
the June 11 "assignment back" of the lease from 
Norsal to Fashions Four Corporation. (R. 202) At 
trial, Fashions Four Corporation argued that Fashion 
Place Associates' consent to that transfer was not 
required under the Massachusetts rule described in 
Point I (supra). Fashions Four Corporation also 
contended that the consent provisions of the lease 
agreement were waived because Fashion Place Associates 
had not signed a written consent to the original 
1978 assignment from Fashions Four Corporation 
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to Norsal. That proposition is defective~ as a matter 
of both law and logic. 
Throughout the trial court proceedings, Fashion 
Place Associates acknowledged that it had in fact 
consented to the 1978 assignment from Fashions 
Four Corporation to Norsal. The trial court in 
fact found that Fashion Place Associates had 
consented to that assignment. (R. 200, Finding 
of Fact No. 9) Fashion Place Associates has 
no dispute with that finding. How then can Fashions 
Four Corporation contend that Fashion Place Associates 
by its conduct at the time of the original assignment 
waived the application of the consent provisions? 
Waiver would have to be based on a finding 
that Fashion Place Associates failed to enforce 
the consent provisions at the time of the 1978 
assignment. The finding of the lower court is 
directly to the contrary. (R. 200) Clearly, because 
the ''consent provision" was not waived in 1978 it 
remained applicable at the time of the attempted 
transfer of June 11, 1981. 
However, for the purposes of argument only, 
assume that the consent provisions were waived at the 
time of the original assignment in 1978. Would such 
.15. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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a waiver have resulted in a waiver at the time of the 
second assignment? The answer to that question is 
found in the last paragraph of Article 22 of 
the lease agreement (R. 30), which reads: 
"The waiver by landlord of any 5reach 
of any term, covenant or condition 
herein contained shall not be deemed 
to be a waiver of such term; covenant 
or condition or any subsequent breach 
of the same or any other term, covenant 
or condition herein contained. The 
subsequent acceptance of rent hereunder 
by landlord shall not be deemed to 
be a waiver of any preceeding breach 
by tenant of any term, covenant or 
condition of this lease, other than 
the failure of tenant to pay the 
particular rental so accepted, regard-
less of landlord's knowledge of such 
preceeding breach at the time of 
acceptance of such rent. No covenant, 
term, or condition of this lease shall 
be deemed to have been waived by 
landlord unless such waiver be in 
writing by landlord." (R. 30) (Emphasis 
added). 
Obviously, even if waiver occurred in 1978, 
under the express language of the contract, there would 
be no resulting waiver in 1981. In Nashville Record 
Prod. vs. Mr. Transmission, Tenn. App., 523 S.W.2d 281 
(1981) a similar "no subsequent waiver" provision was 
found controlling where a defaulting tenant attempted 
to claim that a custom of accepting late payments waived 
the right of the lessor to demand timely payment . 
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Fashions Four Corporation's waiver contention is 
thus doubly defective. First, the exercise of the 
right to consent simply will not result in a waiver 
of that provision. Secondly, a single waiver of the 
consent provision, even assuming one occurred, would 
not result in the waiver of that provision in the 
future under the clear language of the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN SUBSTITUTING 
ITS OWN VERSION OF THE LEASE IN PLACE 
OF THE CLEAR AND SPECIFIC LANGUAGE 
OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT. 
The trial court, in refusing to enforce the 
"no assignment without consent" provisions of the 
lease substituted its own version of the contract 
in place of the clear and specific language agreed 
to by both parties. That substitution is damaging 
in two respects. 
Modern courts recognize the right of individuals 
to contract "according to their desires," and generally 
hold that contracts should be enforced according to 
their terms unless the result is unconscionable. 
Russell vs. Park City Utah Corporation (supra). The 
decision of the lower court to substitute its own 
version of the lease, a version that inserts a hidden 
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exception to the clear language of the document, weakens 
the rights of contracting parties generally to conduct 
their connnercial affairs as they see fit. 
More specifically, the adoption by this Court 
of the Massachusetts rule, that reassignment to an 
original tenant does not require a lessor's consent 
despite express language to the contrary, jeopardizes 
the ability of lessors to meet their contractual 
obligations to other tenants, and reduces the lessor's 
ability to optimize the commercial environment for all 
tenants. The critical importance of tenant "mix" in 
shopping malls has been judicially recognized. Warmack 
vs. Merchant's Nat. Bank of Fort Smith, 612 S.W.2d 733 
(Ark. 1981). 
The waiver argtnnents raised by Fashions Four 
Corporation are totally without merit. The exercise 
of the right to consent by Fashion Place Associates 
in 1978 as regards the original assignment from Fashions 
Four Corporation to Norsal simply does not result in the 
waiver of that same right as regards the 1981 "assign-
ment back" to Fashions Four Corporation. Assuming 
arguendo that the right was waived in 1978, the clear 
language of the contract prohibits any such waiver from 
applying to a future breach . 
. 18. 
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Fashion Place Associates has been wrongfully 
deprived of its right of possession of the lease 
premises since at least July 31, 1981. In the 
interest of justice, the lower court's ruling should 
be reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court 
with instructions to dismiss Fashions Four Corporation's 
Complaint and to enter judgment in favor of Fashron 
Place Associates on its Counterclaim, with further 
proceedings to be held on the amount of damages sus-
tained by Fashion Place Associates. Such action would 
compensate Fash~on Place Associates for the damage 
it has been forced to sustain, and reaffirm this 
Court's commitment to the rights of contract. 
DATED this ~ day of ~ , 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GREEN, HIGGINS & BERRY 
R' o Scott Berry 
Attorney for Defendant-
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